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Abstract
This paper focuses on the pre-establishment period of start-ups in industrial districts. The
industrial architecture is what I call a "rationed agglomeration" in which some entrepre-
neurs gather around an established rm while other entrepreneurs in the same business
stand alone. In a rationed agglomeration, I analyze the e¤ects of relations between es-
tablished rms, network entrepreneurs, and local nanciers on the market prices of loans.
I show that such relations improve the match of capital to ideas in the network even
though the overall distribution of capital to ideas remains unchanged. This suggests that
success breeds success in the networks of established rms. The existence of networks
overturns the claim that there are no motives to engage in information gathering in a
simple market regime with information asymmetries. In particular, I show that there are
market incentives for established rms to decrease the information gap between network
entrepreneurs and local nanciers.
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We [...] show how Clevelands initial locational advantages were magnied, perhaps
serendipitously, by a small number of successful enterprises that both exemplied the
wealth-creation possibilities of these new technologies and served as hubs of overlapping
networks of inventors and nanciers. Focusing on one of the most important of these
hubs the Brush Electric Company we show how such enterprises served multiple func-
tions for the inventors who gathered around them. On the one hand, they were places
that fostered technological crossfertilization and the exchange of ideas about how to solve
particularly di¢ cult problems. On the other hand, they were places where the techno-
logical community could pass on validate promising ideas and thus perform a useful
vetting function for local capitalists.
Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤ (2004, pg. 2)
1 Introduction
One important economic phenomenon is that geographic proximity creates positive externalities
among rms. Sometimes these are physical spillovers in the form of low transportation costs
(Krugman, 1991); sometimes they are intellectual spillovers which are more pronounced among
rms that are close to each other (Glaeser et al., 1992). This paper focuses on a di¤erent
aspect of agglomeration economies. Starting and expanding a business is not easy in a world
of intense competition. It is well documented world-wide that many start-ups end up as
failures within the rst couple of years of starting business (see, for example, Bates (2005),
Brandt (2004), Headd (2003), and OECD (2006) for recent evidence).1 This suggests that
the rms in successful industrial locations must have taken alternative avenues that led them
to experience less frequent business failures. One such e¤ective avenue is to form informal
networks to overcome the stigma of failure. When they are developing ideas and preparing
business strategies, potential entrepreneurs not only interact with each other and established
rms but also get help from the established rms in obtaining funding. This paper analyzes
how these nonmarket institutions (informal networks) form, and then derives the outcome of
the market given their presence to see if they lead to better outcomes for the network members
and for society in general.
I analyze the e¤ects of ties between start-ups and established rms in close geographic prox-
imity, and their relationships with the local nanciers. On one side, for better chances of
survival, new rms need enough liquidity, and better technical expertise in production and
business plans (such as pricing and marketing). On the other side, the source of successful
regional economies can often be tracked down to one or two hub rms which form fertile en-
vironments that facilitate the creation of new rms. These hub rms usually breed new rms
with lower risk of failure by improving the match of capital to ideas within their networks, and
act as seedbeds for new ideas or start-ups by sponsoring the innovative activities of related
individuals. They are the places where potential entrepreneurs meet when they are developing
their marketable ideas.
Most business failures are the result of lack of access to either su¢ cient or cheap enough loans.
The relationships between established rms and potential entrepreneurs usually end up in
nancial collaborations. It is well documented by Petersen and Rajan (1994) that ties between
rms and their creditors are very important for the availability and cost of funds. The hub
1There could be successful and unsuccessful closures. Even with that distinction, there is still a signicant
number of failures: between 30 to 40 percent of rms experience unsuccessful closures within the rst couple
of years of business.
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rms have good relationships with local nanciers which they can use in nding nance for the
projects of entrepreneurs in their networks. They may also invest in these start-ups if they see
any exploitable prot opportunities. This process results in higher success probabilities in the
network.
The general ideas above boil down to a model of the pre-establishment period of start-ups. The
stepping stones of the model are based on the work of Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤
(2004), who provide a wonderful historical case study of nancing innovation in Cleveland,
Ohio in the ninetieth century, which was much like the Silicon Valley of its time, and the role
of networks in generating and nancing innovative ideas. They focus particularly on the Brush
Electric Company, the inventors gathered around it, and the rms that were somehow brought
to life in that rms network. Their paper can also be viewed as the empirical support (or the
historical evidence) for the model presented here. I quote passages from this paper wherever
necessary to elucidate the assumptions and results.
The pre-establishment period of start-ups is assumed to have two phases. In phase I, potential
entrepreneurs collect information about their subject matter. They not only develop innovative
ideas but also consider how to market and sell these ideas. They have two options in this
phase: they can either stand alone and develop their innovative ideas and business strategies by
themselves or they can join the network of a hub rm that provides a collaborative environment
with other would-be entrepreneurs. Phase I is similar to the R&D game presented in Inci (2005)
with some di¤erences. If an entrepreneur stands alone, his benet results from his own e¤ort
(which has both a deterministic and a random component) and the knowledge that spills over
from the nearby entrepreneurs. The benet that derives from an entrepreneurs own e¤ort is
the same no matter whether he is in or outside the network, and joining the network is costly.
However, the degree of knowledge spillover is higher among entrepreneurs who are in the same
network.
It turns out that, as a result of network externalities, any stable equilibrium has to be a corner
outcome. That is, either all entrepreneurs prefer to join the network or they all prefer to stand
alone. The reason for this is that an entrepreneur nds it benecial to join a network only if
su¢ cient numbers of others are doing so. Nonetheless a hub rm cannot allow just anyone to
join its network, which suggests that there will be some sort of rationing process involved in
joining the network. This is why we observe rms that are related to each other as well as
some others that stand alone in the same industrial district. I call this industrial architecture
a "rationed agglomeration." At the end of phase I, the random part of the individual benet is
drawn by the nature, and thus, the types of projects are determined. I assume for simplicity
that there can only be two outcomes: good or bad. Hence, there will be entrepreneurs with
projects of high and low success probability both in and outside the network. However, I
assume that those with a good drawing will be higher in number in the network than outside
the network.2
Phase II of the pre-establishment period of start-ups involves seeking funding for the business
projects that are already in hand. In this stage, entrepreneurs have already established their
networks, come up with their innovative ideas, and prepared the business plans associated
with these ideas. Phase II, therefore, focuses on a rationed agglomeration in which there are
more high-success probability projects in the network than outside the network. This phase is a
variation of the project nancing game of Inci (2006). However, the population is now composed
of two groups, network entrepreneurs and stand-alone entrepreneurs. It is assumed that all
projects are worthy even though some of them have better chances of survival. E¢ ciency
2This is sometimes called the "network e¤ect" in the literature to refer to the advantages of interacting in
a network.
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requires that all of these projects should be nanced, and thus, credit rationing is not an issue
in this model. This helps me highlight the important result that nonmarket institutions may
induce ine¢ cient agglomeration in the presence of asymmetric information.
Under normal conditions, entrepreneurs apply for bank loans to nance their projects. There
are, however, two important assumptions of the model. First, a hub rm has a belief about
the project type of an entrepreneur which may or may not be correct for this particular en-
trepreneur, but its beliefs on average are informative due to its repeated relationships with
entrepreneurs in phase I. It can make useful judgments simply because it has long years of
business experience, although there is still some room for incorrect judgments. The network
membership of those who are believed to have low-success probability projects expires auto-
matically at this point. Second, a hub rm has close relationships with local nanciers to whom
it can convey its beliefs about the entrepreneurs in its network. Given the rst assumption,
this channel can decrease the information gap between the network entrepreneurs and local
nanciers. Then, if the local nanciers trust the information they get from the hub rm, they
will provide cheaper loans to those who are labeled as good by the hub rm, and they will
decline the applications for privileged loans of those who are labeled as bad.
The declined group, as stand-alone entrepreneurs, may then apply for regular loans that are
readily available in the loan market from either the banks or local nanciers. Being aware of
these relations in the market, lenders (both banks and local nanciers) would then change their
beliefs about the distribution of types in their loan applicant pool, since a better sample of
entrepreneurs is nanced with cheaper loans by the local nanciers who have an informational
advantage on this sample. This means that the price of loans is higher for the stand-alone
entrepreneurs and for those who are declined for privileged loans. Therefore, the hub rms
signaling improves the credit market outcome of those who stay in the network and worsens
the outcome of the rest.
It is commonly believed that there are no motives to engage in information extraction in a
simple market regime with information asymmetries (see Campbell and Kracaw (1980)). This
raises the question of why a hub rm would have any incentive to decrease the information gap
between entrepreneurs and local nanciers. When there is pooling equilibrium in the credit
markets which is the case in this paper the market overvalues the start-ups with low success
probabilities and undervalues the start-ups with high success probabilities. The existence
of networks alters the level of under- and overvaluation. I show that hub-signaling always
makes entrepreneurs with high success probability better o¤ by decreasing the level of the
markets undervaluation of their start-ups. However, entrepreneurs with low success probability
projects prefer hub-signaling when the network is large enough (or when the signals are not
very informative). In such cases, both parties prefer hub-signaling, and side payments promised
by them can be su¢ cient incentives for the hub rm to organize hub-signaling. However, when
the network is small (or the signals are su¢ ciently informative), owners of the low success
probability start-ups prefer the status quo while the owners of the high success probability
start-ups prefer hub-signaling. Yet, I show that the maximum amount of side payments that
the latter group is willing and able to pay to the hub rm is higher than that of the former
group. This implies that there are certain incentives for the hub rm to form the hub-signaling
mechanism. As I show in the paper, this result can be fairly generalized to a case in which
extracting the information about start-ups is costly for the hub rm. Thus, the existence of
networks overturns the claim that there will not be costly information extraction. This also
suggests that asymmetric information can result in ine¢ cient agglomeration.
I assume throughout the paper that the hub rm conveys its signals honestly to the local
nanciers. There are a couple of reasons to believe this. First, the hub rm may have some
4
repeated nancial relationship with the local nanciers. If so, it may not be in its best interest
in the long run to act dishonestly. Moreover, acting dishonestly may jeopardize its credibility
in the market as well. Whenever the credibility of signals is a problem, local nanciers may
nance the start-ups only if the hub rm is also investing in those projects reasoning that if the
hub rm believes that its recommended entrepreneurs will have better start-ups on average, it
should be more than happy to invest in them. Section 5 formally shows that the signals of the
hub rm are credible only if it has su¢ ciently large stakes in these start-ups. However, this
can happen only when the hub rm has su¢ cient assets. Therefore, the established rms that
can credibly organize hub-signaling will be the ones with deep pockets.
The only positive e¤ect of the network in this model comes from phase I, in creating more
high success probability projects. In phase II, networks may improve their possible outcomes
in the market; however, this may not be useful for society in general since the quality com-
position of entrepreneurs is still the same. That is, with or without hub-signaling, there will
remain the same number of high and low success probability projects in the region, since the
lenders will still prefer to nance both types of projects. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) show that
nonmarket institutions may be dysfunctional when they are not informationally advantaged
over the market which is also the case in this paper if the signals of the hub rm are not
informative on average. Beyond that, what the model presented here suggests is that even in
the case in which the nonmarket institution is informationally advantaged (e.g.; relationships
generate useful information), the outcome may not be more useful for society than otherwise.
Hub-signaling can create islands of related entrepreneurs that experience less frequent business
failures and enjoy cheaper loans even though the overall failure rate in the population remains
unchanged. Therefore, an observation of a high number of better types in a network is not
su¢ cient to imply that this network is socially desirable.
This paper is related to the empirical paper by Petersen and Rajan (1994) which nds that
banking relationships are valuable, although they conclude that these relationships appear
to operate more through quantities than prices.3 However, they implicitly assume that the
decreases in the cost of loanable funds are passed on to the borrowers, which is not necessarily
the case in the presence of monopolistic power over information. This is consistent with the
results derived here. Suppose there is only one local nancier that has access to the signals of
the hub rm. Since it has monopoly power on this information it knows that the default rate
in its loan applicant pool will now be lower, but it does not need to reect this change to the
borrowers. In that case, it can still nance the same entrepreneurs with the same loan prices
available in the market and make positive prots because of its informational advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the pre-establishment period of start-
ups, which has two phases. Phase I the phase in which entrepreneurs work on innovative
ideas and prepare their business plans  is modeled in section 3. Entrepreneurs network
formation decisions and the resulting industrial architecture in the region are also discussed in
this section. Phase II the phase in which entrepreneurs apply for business loans is modeled
in section 4. In this section, the canonical project-nancing equilibrium from banks is derived
as a benchmark followed by the analysis of the role of established rms in entrepreneursloan
applications to the local nanciers. Section 5 discusses the incentive scheme for the hub rm
3I focus on relationships between start-ups and an already established rm which has relationships with
local nanciers. The relationship in Petersen and Rajan (1994) is between lenders and borrowers, not via a hub
rm. The hub rms ideas about the entrepreneur that it conveys to the lenders should be more credible than
an entrepreneurs signaling of his own type. Moreover, Petersen and Rajan (1994) focus on already established
rms whereas I focus on start-up rms for which the data cannot capture the relationship as they dene it.
They dene the relationship as having at least one other nancial service from the lender besides borrowing,
such as depository services, factoring, or pension fund management.
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to organize hub-signaling assumed in the previous sections. Costly signaling and the reliability
of signals are also discussed here as extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes. An appendix
contains some of the proofs.
2 A model of pre-establishment period of start-ups
I start o¤ with a thumbnail sketch of the model followed by a formal analysis.
2.1 Thumbnail sketch of the model
I consider a simple model of a regional economy to model the pre-establishment period of start-
ups. There are two phases in this period. The rst phase is the idea-generation stage in which
potential entrepreneurs try to develop their business projects. This requires not only engaging
in invention projects that might end up with an innovation with some economic value but
also developing business plans such as pricing and marketing strategies. In section 3, I model
this phase and try to explain why we observe di¤erent economic architectures across time and
space. The focus of this part of the model is on the aggregate level of a regional economy and
it tries to provide some insights into why there are some industrial districts where a number of
rms in a network have gathered around established rms while there are other entrepreneurs
in the same market who stand alone. Basically, this part analyzes what I call a "rationed
agglomeration" (partial agglomeration of start-ups around some established rms).
In the second phase, potential entrepreneurs have already come up with their business ideas
which are presumably somewhat risky. They are now in a position to look for nancing pos-
sibilities for their projects. As I argue in the introduction of the paper, the main obstacle to
the formation of new rms is the relentless stigma of failure. Section 4 models this start-up
nancing game between entrepreneurs and lenders (banks and local nanciers) in the presence
of a rationed agglomeration around an established rm. I explain the role of this established
rm in nding (possibly) cheaper nancing for the (potentially) better entrepreneurs in its
network by conveying its beliefs about the quality of their projects to the local nanciers.
Below I use the words entrepreneur, rm, inventor, individual, and agent interchangeably. Do-
ing so does not make much di¤erence for my purposes since I track the ow of the business
project itself rather than its owners at di¤erent times in its lifecycle. In a more general frame-
work, inventors come up with an innovative idea; then, an entrepreneur who may or may
not be the same person as the inventor carries out the project. Where it makes a di¤erence
at all, the payo¤ structure of the model implicitly takes into account the net economics e¤ects
of any exchanges of the business project among parties. I also use "entrepreneur" instead of
"potential entrepreneur" at some places for brevity. This is harmless since there is no credit
rationing in this model, and thus, all potential entrepreneurs will become entrepreneurs no
matter what happens.
2.2 Environment and timing
Suppose there is a region at the beginning of the period that can become a thriving industrial
district if it experiences a constant formation of successful rms over time. What I have in
mind is a would-be agglomeration at the very beginning of its lifecycle that can become a
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successful industrial district such as Silicon Valley of the present time or Cleveland, Ohio of
the late nineteenth century. As evidenced by Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤ (2004), such
agglomerations can often be tracked down to one or two rms which act as incubators for new
rms with higher success probabilities. For simplicity, I assume that there is one such rm,
which I call a hub rm and denote by h. However, the analysis can be generalized to a case in
which there are more than one hub rm.4 If this hub rm is unsuccessful, then this is the end
of the story. To model how success breeds success, the rest of the analysis thus focuses on a
hub rm which is known to be a successful innovative rm.
There is also a unit mass of entrepreneurs who plan to engage in start-up activities in an
innovative sector.5 This might be the biotechnology or nanotechnology sectors today, and
electric light, steel or chemistry sectors at the time of Brush Electric Company. Start-up
activities require pre-establishment preparations. These preparations can be anything related
to the business project that entrepreneurs plan to employ in the post-establishment period.
Innovative idea generation and business plans (such as marketing and pricing strategies) can
summarize almost all of these pre-establishment period activities.
All entrepreneurs are assumed to be identical at the beginning. These identical entrepreneurs
decide whether to join the network of the hub rm h. Then, they learn their types at the end of
phase I. Finally, phase II starts given the distribution of types within and outside the network.
3 Phase I: innovative idea creation and business plans
[...] Inventors who were just starting their careers needed some [...] way to signal that their
ideas were promising. Here Clevelands industrial hubs played a critical role. Because
they were collecting points for technological expertise, they served an important vetting
function. Inventors seeking validation for their ideas gravitated to these hubs. So did
business people in search of protable investments. In this way, the networks that formed
around innovative rms like Brush Electric and White Sewing Machine became engines
of local economic development. They encouraged the geographic concentration both
of technological creativity and of venture capital. They also matched inventors who
had promising ideas with business people who possessed the managerial skills needed to
transform these ideas into productive enterprises. (Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤,
2004, pg. 35)
Entrepreneurs are in a position to decide between two options in phase I. They can work on
their projects alone in which case they have to come up with their innovative ideas and prepare
their business strategies independently (call this a stand-alone entrepreneur). Alternatively,
they can approach the hub rm where there may be other entrepreneurs working on similar
projects and try to make use of the collaborative environment by interacting with the other
would-be entrepreneurs in the network (call this a network entrepreneur). Entrepreneur is
own e¤ort creates a net benet with both a deterministic and a random part:
b(e) + "i 8i 2 [0; 1] ; (1)
4There is no harm to perceive the hub rm as a representative of all hub rms for my purpose in this paper,
just like we do for "representative consumer" in consumption theory.
5A continuum of agents is assumed for technical convenience. The analysis can easily be modied to allow
for a discrete number of rms in which case, to prevent technical complications, one of the production factors
has to be assumed to be innitely indivisible.
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where e is the level of e¤ort and b(e) is the deterministic part of the net benet from e¤ort
with b0(e) > 0, and "i is the individual specic random part of the net benet from e¤ort.
This specication allows that some entrepreneurs may end up with better ideas even though
all entrepreneurs are ex ante identical. A further specication of the random part is given at
the end of this section.
In addition to the benet that comes from e¤ort, entrepreneurs also benet by observing the
other entrepreneurs around them. This is simply the usual story of spillovers, but here spillovers
include not only technological knowledge but knowledge about business plans as well. I call
them knowledge spillovers altogether and denote with  the amount of knowledge that ows
to an entrepreneur from another entrepreneur. As usual, how much entrepreneurs benet from
knowledge spillovers depends on their ability to value, exploit, and apply the knowledge in
their businesses. I denote absorptive capacity of an entrepreneur with t. Given a unit mass of
entrepreneurs working on business projects in close proximity, the net benet of an entrepreneur
from knowledge spillovers is
t 8 2 [0; 1] : (2)
Making use of (1) and (2), the total net benet of becoming a stand-alone entrepreneur for
entrepreneur i is
V Si = b(e) + t + "i 8i 2 [0; 1] ; (3)
where superscript S denotes the set of stand-alone entrepreneurs.
The second option for an entrepreneur is to interact with the hub rm. Entrepreneurs who will
potentially engage in start-up activities can benet by interacting with the established rms in
the pre-establishment period for various reasons. The rst and most important reason is the role
played by established rms as the mediums of exchanging ideas. Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and
Sokolo¤ (2004) reported how Brush Electric Company in Cleveland, Ohio fostered exchanging
ideas to solve di¢ cult problems and acted as a place for technological cross-fertilization in
the era of the Second Industrial Revolution. This exchange is, of course, not and should
not be limited to innovative ideas. The rms of today do not have the luxury to learn how
to sell innovative ideas by trial and error. To be successful, organizations have to develop
marketable ideas that are backed up with strong business plans. For example, stable pricing
and marketing strategies play crucial roles in determining the survival chances of start-up rms.
Network entrepreneurs can develop those techniques or learn them from other entrepreneurs
in the network.
All of these factors create incentives for potential entrepreneurs to gather around established
rms to exploit the knowledge existing in them. This may also be benecial to the established
rms since they can increase their stock of knowledge in this process of cross-fertilization of
ideas. All in all, we observe that some would-be entrepreneurs are part of a network in which
one or two established rms are the crucial nodes. There are, of course, costs and benets
associated with being a member of this network for both parties. To highlight the results
without unnecessary complications, this paper models the costs and benets that accrue to the
start-ups but takes the hub rms decision as granted. Section 3.2 incorporates the hub rms
decision and section 5 explores if there are incentives for hub rms to arrange such networks.
There may be rationing in deciding membership to this network. Presumably, established
rms would not want to allow any number of entrepreneurs to join their networks. This
is not only because they might not have the resources for that, but also because too many
entrepreneurs interacting in the network may create congestion in exchanging ideas even when
all entrepreneurs are identical (see, for example, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) who show that
social e¤ects are positive when there are few agents in the network, and negative when there
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are many).
When entrepreneurs join the network, they still need to provide the same e¤ort in their pre-
establishment period preparations. However, being a part of the network allows them to
benet more from the knowledge of the other network entrepreneurs. To capture these ideas,
I assume that the knowledge spillover between network rms, denoted by , is greater than .
Nonetheless, being a part of the network is costly. It is much like a club that members have
to pay a fee to enter. However, this fee does not have to be pecuniary. In some cases, it may
well be the time and congestion costs associated with repeated interactions with other network
members.
Let the ratio of entrepreneurs who choose to become a network entrepreneur be . Hence, the
total net benet of becoming a network entrepreneur for entrepreneur i is
V Ni = b(e) + t[+ (1  )]  c+ "i 8i; ;  2 [0; 1] ^  >  ; (4)
where superscript N denotes the set of network entrepreneurs and c is the cost of entering the
network. This specication implies that knowledge might not spill over to the same extent
within and outside the network, which is consistent with Acs et al. (2005) who show that
the spillover of knowledge need not occur automatically as has typically been assumed in
endogenous growth models.
Some comments on the random part of the benet from e¤ort are in order. I assume that
entrepreneurs but no one else  learn "i once they nalize their business plans but before
they apply for loans. I further assume that  of the network entrepreneurs will have a good
draw, "i = "H > 0, and the rest will have a bad draw, "i = "L < 0, such that "Ni := E["i j i 2
N ] = "H + (1   )"L, where subscript H is for high type and subscript L is for low type.6
However, I also assume that  of the stand-alone entrepreneurs will have a good draw and the
rest will have a bad draw, such that "Si := E["i j i 2 S] = "H + (1  )"L. Therefore, by the
law of large numbers
Pr("i = "H) =

 if i 2 N
 if i 2 S 8i 2 [0; 1] ^  <  : (5)
I assume that  and  are common knowledge.7  <  is assumed to capture what is called
a "network e¤ect" in the literature. It is well known that successful networks have dispro-
portionately more high-type individuals even though some stand-alone individuals are able to
achieve the same performance by themselves outside the network. Note that "Ni > "
S
i . For
future reference, dene the di¤erence between "Ni and "
S
i as " for the sake of brevity of the
equations. The analysis below focuses on the cases in which c > ".8
3.1 Network formation
I assume that the cost of joining the network is less than its net benet, which is stated formally
in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 t(  ) + " > c.
6Entrepreneurs do not know their type at the point that they are making a decision on whether to join or
not to join the network since the types are drawn at the end of phase I.
7This assumption is nothing but the conventional assumption in contract theory that the distribution of
types is publicly known.
8The case in which c < " is trivial and the analysis of it is left to the reader.
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Given the net benet scheme specied in the previous section, the network formation equi-
librium is the ratio of entrepreneurs in the network, , such that none of the entrepreneurs
has incentive to change his decision on whether or not to join the network. At this phase,
entrepreneurs do not yet have information about the random part of their net benet from
e¤ort. Assuming that they are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers, in any equilibrium of
the network formation the following inequality must hold:
maxfEV Si ();EV Ni ()g  maxfEV Si ();EV Ni ()g 8i;  2 [0; 1] : (6)
In an interior equilibrium, EV Si (
) = EV Ni (
) has to be satised. This implies that an
interior equilibrium is obtained when
 =
c "
t(  ) : (7)
However, network externalities prevent this from being a stable equilibrium. Suppose the
economy is in the interior equilibrium with  entrepreneurs in the network. If an entrepreneur
decides to stand alone instead of joining the network, the expected net benet of each of the
other entrepreneurs in the network decreases by t(   ) while the expected net benet of
stand-alone entrepreneurs remains unchanged. If, on the other hand, an entrepreneur does the
opposite, the expected net benet of each of the other entrepreneurs in the network increases
by t( ) while that of stand-alone entrepreneurs remains unchanged. Therefore, the interior
solution  = (c ")=(t( )) cannot be a stable equilibrium. Then, any stable equilibrium
of network formation has to be a corner solution (i.e.; either all entrepreneurs prefer to join
the network ( = 1) or none of them prefers to join the network ( = 0)).
Proposition 1 (Agglomeration vs. Dispersion) There are multiple equilibria of network
formation and any stable equilibrium has to be a corner solution. Therefore, either all entre-
preneurs agglomerate around the hub rm or all of them stand alone.
Figure 1: Network formation equilibria
A graphical characterization of the equilibria is shown in Figure 1. The number of entrepreneurs
forming links with the hub rm is given in the x-axis and entrepreneursexpected payo¤s are
given on the y-axis. AB is the expected payo¤ of an entrepreneur when he joins the network.
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As expected, it increases with the number of network entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the
payo¤ of a stand-alone entrepreneur, which is represented by CD in the gure, is independent
of the number of entrepreneurs. Since joining the network is costly, AB starts below CD.
Figure 1 also points to the network externality problem. There has to be a su¢ ciently high
number of entrepreneurs in the network (e.g.; at least (c   ")=(t(   )) entrepreneurs) to
make an entrepreneur at least as better o¤ as he can be outside the network. Therefore, there
is a coordination problem caused by network externalities: joining the network is individually
rational only if enough of the others are doing so. As stated in Proposition 1, there are three
di¤erent equilibria, one of which is not stable. A stable equilibrium is obtained either when
all entrepreneurs stand alone or all join the network, both of which are corner solutions. The
former happens at point C and the latter happens at point D in the gure. An interior
solution occurs where AB intersects CD at point E. However, it is not stable since even a
small perturbation or a shock to the system could lead the economy out of this equilibrium
because of the snowball e¤ect caused by network externalities.
3.2 Network architecture: rationed agglomeration
The previous section makes its analysis under the assumption of an open-club-type of network.
Any entrepreneur who is willing to join the network can do so freely. However, this neglects
the decision of the hub rm. To incorporate that, assume for the moment that the economic
problem of the hub rm prevents it from forming links with all entrepreneurs, and suppose
that it is willing to create links only with  of them.
Figure 2: Hub rms decision and network formation
If  < (c ")=(t(   )), then there will be a complete dispersion of entrepreneurs. Such a
situation is shown in Figure 2. Suppose the hub rm is willing to form links with 1 entrepre-
neurs. Then, the equilibrium has to happen at point C, the unique and stable equilibrium of
network formation in this case. Entrepreneurs cannot benet much from the knowledge base
of the network since the number of entrepreneurs allowed in the network is not su¢ cient for
enough knowledge spillovers. Thus, they all prefer to stand-alone and the industry experiences
low knowledge spillovers. In that sense, this is a "bad equilibrium" with no collaboration. An
industrial district with these characteristics would probably experience lower growth rates.
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If   (c   ")=(t(   )), then  entrepreneurs will be able to form links even though all
entrepreneurs would prefer forming links with the hub rm. Figure 2 shows this situation.
Suppose the hub rm is willing to form links with 2 entrepreneurs. Then, a stable equilibrium
occurs at point D. This means that 1  2 entrepreneurs are not able to join the network even
though they want to do so. This suggests that there has to be some kind of rationing by the
hub rm in its selection of entrepreneurs.
Denition 1 (Rationed Agglomeration) A rationed agglomeration is an agglomeration of
a limited number of entrepreneurs around the hub rm(s) even though all entrepreneurs prefer
to do so.
Under our assumption of identical entrepreneurs, the best the hub rm can do is a random
rationing like that in the models of credit rationing à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Models
of agglomeration usually predict either complete agglomeration or complete dispersion of en-
trepreneurs whenever there is a corner solution. What I propose here is somewhat di¤erent
from those predictions and is more consistent with reality. What we observe in reality is there
are some entrepreneurs that are linked to each other while others in the same business stand
alone. If agglomeration forces make forming links benecial for an entrepreneur, they must do
the same for all the others, as they are assumed to be identical in all respects before nature
determines the random part of their net benet. What is more, even though agglomeration
forces lead entrepreneurs to one or the other corner, some sort of rationing mechanism may
prevent such outcomes. This makes ex ante identical entrepreneurs di¤erent ex post, and we
end up with a corner solution that looks like an interior solution.9
Note that whenever   (c ")=(t(  )) in addition to the ones I analyze above, point E
would still be an equilibrium, but, as discussed before, it is unstable unless  = (c ")=(t( 
)) and so is left aside in the analysis below. The results of this section are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Rationed Agglomeration) If  < (c   ")=(t(   )), there is complete
dispersion of entrepreneurs. If   (c ")=(t(  )), there can be a rationed agglomeration
in which only  entrepreneurs can form links with the hub rm even though all of them prefer
to do so.
Some comments on the multiplicity of equilibria are in order. The possibility of multiple
equilibria can explain why we observe di¤erent industrial architectures in di¤erent places at
di¤erent times. Whenever a dispersion equilibrium occurs (point C in Figure 2), entrepreneurs
do not collaborate with each other. In other equilibria (either unstable equilibrium of point E or
stable equilibrium of pointD), there is high collaboration between entrepreneurs. Any unstable
equilibrium will sooner or later be broken, which explains why some industrial clusters change
their structure in a very short period of time. These equilibria can also be ranked in terms of
entrepreneurswelfare. Points C and E give the same aggregate payo¤ to the entrepreneurs.
However, at point D, network entrepreneurs get higher payo¤s and stand-alone entrepreneurs
get exactly the same payo¤s they would get at points D and E. Therefore, the aggregate
welfare of entrepreneurs is higher at point D than at points C and E. In that sense, I conclude
9This can also be viewed as a gentlemens club or an academic alliance. Even though many similar individ-
uals prefer to be a part of them, there will be room only for a limited number of them. Then, the institution
applies some rationing rule which may or may not be random.
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that points C and E are ine¢ cient equilibria by noting that this analysis neglects the payo¤
to the hub rm.10
The above analysis implicitly assumes a star network structure among the hub rm and en-
trepreneurs. In a star network, one player (in this case the established rm) is at the center
of the network and the others (in this case the entrepreneurs) gather around it. This is not
only a plausible network architecture observed in actual industrial clusters but also a theo-
retically justiable one. Bala and Goyal (2000) work on the very general payo¤ structures of
noncooperative network formation games. They show that in a model of two-way knowledge
spillovers, the strong Nash equilibrium of a network structure tends to be either an empty
network in which none of the agents is connected to the others (coinciding with the complete
dispersion result of Proposition 2) or a star network (coinciding with the agglomeration result
of Proposition 2).
4 Phase II: nancing of business projects
[B]efore they would be willing to invest in new technological ventures, wealthy individuals
had to be convinced of two things: rst and most obviously, that it was indeed possible
to earn high rates of return by putting their money in this kind of enterprise; [...] by
serving as the hub of overlapping networks of inventors and investors, [hub rms] could
both stimulate ongoing inventive activity and provide the expertise needed to assess the
economic merits of the resulting discoveries. (Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤, 2004,
pg. 14)
In the second phase of the pre-establishment period of start-ups, entrepreneurs seek nancing
for their risky investment projects. At this stage, they have already developed their busi-
ness projects and established their network. This means that they now know what kind of
a project they have: a promising high success probability project or a not-so-promising low
success probability project.
The way I model this is the following. At the end of phase I, entrepreneurs learn the random
part of their net benets from e¤ort11, which is denoted by "i in eq. (1). I assume, without
loss of generality, that there is a one-to-one mapping from the net benets of the entrepreneurs
to the success probability of their start-ups. Those who experience a good draw, "H , will have
a success probability of pH , and those who experience a bad draw, "L, will have a success
probability of pL, where pH > pL. Formally,
pi =

pH if "i = "H
pL if "i = "L
8i 2 [0; 1] : (8)
The base model here thus boils down to a canonical project-nancing model with two types:
entrepreneurs with high and low success probability projects. However, there is a di¤erence.
10Nonetheless, note that I do not need a hub rm to get this result. Even in the absence of a hub rm,
this result says that entrepreneurs might be better o¤ by interacting with each other but they can end up with
an ine¢ cient equilibrium of no cooperation due to coordination problems. One might, therefore, be tempted
to predict that entrepreneurs can cooperate by solving this coordination problem. Although it seems possible
in this simple framework of identical entrepreneurs, such an incentive vanishes in richer environments with
heterogeneous agents. The simple reason for this is that coordination might not make all entrepreneurs but
only a subgroup of them better o¤, in which case it is not supported by all (or possibly by the majority).
11This is an important assumption that connects phase I to phase II without any problems.
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The type of a start-up can be a¤ected by its entrepreneurs interactions in phase I. That is, the
distribution of project types di¤ers according to the entrepreneurspast decisions on whether
to join the network:  of the network entrepreneurs have a high success probability project,
whereas only  of the stand-alone entrepreneurs have a high success probability project.
To focus on the interesting cases, from now on I assume that   c=(t(   )) and that the
economy is in a rationed agglomeration equilibrium (i.e.; there are  network entrepreneurs
and 1    stand-alone entrepreneurs). Given this, there are  network entrepreneurs with
a high success probability project and (1   ) network entrepreneurs with a low success
probability project. The corresponding numbers for stand-alone entrepreneurs are (1   )
and (1   )(1   ), respectively. Therefore, the overall number of entrepreneurs in the whole
population with high success probability projects is
 + (1  ) ; (9)
and the number of those with low success probability projects is
(1  ) + (1  )(1  ) : (10)
To be able to undertake a project, an entrepreneur has to have I units of capital. It is assumed
for simplicity that entrepreneurs have no wealth. Therefore, they need to borrow I units of
capital from a lender. In the base model, I assume that they nance their projects from one
source, which is consistent with the ndings of Petersen and Rajan (1994) on small business
nancing. The cost of loanable funds is equal to the risk-free (gross) interest rate R in the
economy. If an entrepreneur is successful, the project yields Y units of capital at the end of
the period, and if not it yields a smaller return, which is normalized to here zero. I also assume
that all projects have a positive net present value, which is stated in the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (NPV of Projects) pHY > pLY > RI.
Therefore, it is not only the case that all entrepreneurs prefer undertaking their projects had
they been able to fully self-nance their projects, but also that lenders prefer nancing all
projects. Therefore, the focus of this paper is not on the ine¢ ciencies that rise up because of
lemons problem in the loan market, but simply the pricing problem of di¤erent projects and the
resulting incentive scheme that induces certain network structures.12 As is shown later, only
pooling contracts can be o¤ered in the loan market. Thus, the start-ups of the entrepreneurs
with high success probability projects are undervalued in the market.
4.1 Sequence of events
The sequence of the events in phase II is as follows. Since every entrepreneur is assumed to
have no wealth they all need to borrow to start their rms. At the beginning of phase II,
entrepreneurs sign nancial contracts with lenders and make their investments. Successful
entrepreneurs pay o¤ their loans once their payo¤s are realized at the end of the period.
12Inci (2006) focuses on such ine¢ ciencies by assuming that the low success probability start-ups have
negative net present value. Note also that the problem here does not entail any credit rationing.
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4.2 Lenders (banks and local nanciers)
The lenders are risk neutral lenders in Bertrand competition with each other. They can be
either banks or local nanciers. They form their beliefs simultaneously and choose the contracts
they will o¤er taking as given the cost of loanable funds, which is equal to the risk-free interest
rate of R. At this moment, both banks and local nanciers are assumed to have the same
information set. However, later I incorporate the possibility that local nanciers can make use
of local information available from the hub rm.
Lenders o¤er contracts contingent on the announced type and the project outcome (either
success or failure) of an entrepreneur. Contracts specify the repayments to the lenders for both
outcomes. Let the repayment to the lender be DGi (R) in the good outcome and D
B
i (R) in the
bad, where G stands for good and B for bad. The general form of the contract o¤ered by
lender l is
C l 

CH
CL

=

DGH(R) D
B
H(R)
DGL (R) D
B
L (R)

: (11)
Here CH is the contract designed for loan applicants with a high success probability project
and CL is for applicants with a low success probability project. I assume that there is lim-
ited liability, and therefore, contracts cannot leave entrepreneurs with negative end-of-period
payo¤s:
Gi  0 and Bi  0 8i = H;L ; (12)
where Gi is the realized payo¤ of an entrepreneur in the good state and 
B
i is the realized
payo¤ of an entrepreneur in the bad state.
4.3 Entrepreneurs
The expected payo¤ of an entrepreneur at the beginning of the period, , is given by
 = pi(Y  Dki (R))  (1  pi)Dki (R)  0 8i = H;L 8k = B;G : (13)
An entrepreneur is going to be successful with probability pi in which case he produces Y
and gives Dki of it to the bank. Thus, the expected net return in the case of a good state
is pi(Y   Dki ). If he is unsuccessful he produces something less than Y (which is normalized
to zero) and gives Dki of it to the bank. However, limited liability prevents D
k
i from being
higher than what the entrepreneur has. Since the low output is normalized to zero it follows
immediately that Dki is going to be zero as well, but for the sake of generality of the analysis I
keep it.
4.4 Equilibrium denition
I use the standard Bertrand-Nash equilibrium concept. An equilibrium comprises all contracts
o¤ered by lenders that are consistent with each other. Each lender o¤ers entrepreneurs a
contract that maximizes his prots. Then, among all alternatives, entrepreneurs choose the
best contract for them. Formally, an equilibrium in the credit market is dened as follows.
Denition 2 (Equilibrium Concept) Assume that lenders are Bertrand-Nash players fol-
lowing pure strategies. Given R, a credit market equilibrium is the contract o¤ered by lenders
such that all contracts earn nonnegative prots and there are no new contracts that could earn
higher prots.
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An equilibrium has to be individually rational and incentive compatible for every entrepreneur.
After normalizing the payo¤ to an entrepreneur in case of inactivity to zero, individual ratio-
nality asserts that an entrepreneur i can earn at least as much as he could when he does not
participate in the market at all:
pi(Y  DGi (R))  (1  pi)DBi (R)  0 8i = H;L : (14)
Incentive compatibility assures that entrepreneur i does not have an incentive to apply for the
loan contract aimed at entrepreneurs j:
pi(Y  DGi (R))  (1  pi)DBi (R)  pi(Y  DGj (R))  (1  pi)DBj (R) 8i; j = H;L : (15)
Under these conditions, it is impossible to design contracts such that entrepreneurs with dif-
ferent projects in terms of success probabilities self-select themselves into di¤erent contracts.
In other words, it is impossible to identify which entrepreneurs have high success probability
projects since it is always benecial for an entrepreneur with a low success probability project
to misrepresent himself as having a high success probability project. Lemma 1 proves this
claim formally.
Lemma 1 There exists no separating equilibrium in the credit market.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
4.5 Start-up nancing without hub-signaling
As a benchmark begin with the case in which there is a network but the hub rm has no
role in start-up nancing. In this case, entrepreneurs simply apply for loans by themselves.
From Lemma 1, the only possibility in the loan market is a pooling contract which imposes
DGH(R) = D
G
F (R) = D
G and DBH(R) = D
B
L (R) = D
B. Figure 3 derives the pooling equilibrium.
ZPp is the zero-prot condition with both types of projects above which the prot of the lender
increases and under which it decreases. ZPp is given by
pDG + (1  p)DB = RI ; (16)
where p is the average success probability of the projects of the loan applicant pool. The
applicant pool is composed of both network and stand-alone entrepreneurs. By making use of
(9) and (10), this average success probability can be written as
p = [ + (1  )]pH + [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL : (17)
To determine the pooling equilibrium, start with an arbitrary contract, say, C1. The iso-prot
lines passing through C1 are shown in Figure 3. The steeper one is for a low success probability
project and the other is for a high success probability project. C1 cannot be an equilibrium
since there is a deviation contract C2 northwest of it which is attractive to an entrepreneur with
a high success probability project but not to an entrepreneur with a low success probability
project. There exist such deviation contracts as long as the contract is not on the y-axis.
However, there is no such deviation contract on the y-axis, because contracts have to be in
the rst quadrant by limited liability. However, any contract on the y-axis, such as C3, cannot
be an equilibrium if it makes positive prots. Otherwise, it can be undercut by Bertrand
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Figure 3: Pooling equilibrium without hub-signaling
competition. Zero prots are obtained at the intersection of ZPp and the y-axis where the
equilibrium pooling contract C is obtained. The pair of iso-prot lines passing through C are
shown by the lines HH 0 and LL0 for a high and a low success probability project, respectively,
in the gure.
The equilibrium pooling contract takes the simple debt form with a repayment of RI=p in the
good state and zero repayment in the bad state:
DG =
RI
p
; DB = 0 : (18a)
The e¤ective interest rate implied by this contract is R=p.
4.6 Local nanciers and hub-signaling
The entrepreneurs who organized and promoted [...] new ventures secured investment
capital largely by relying on personal connections. [...] [T]hey could be based on the
recommendations of men who had established their expertise in the community, as when
Brush secured backing for the Linde Air Products Company simply by assuring local
businessmen of the merits of the technology. (Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤, 2004,
pg. 27)
Throughout phase I, entrepreneurs have close and repeated relationships with the hub rm.
The hub rm, thus, has a rough idea of the quality of the projects of these entrepreneurs. For
the moment, I assume that this information is costless and comes naturally due to repeated
interaction between the parties in phase I. Section 5.1 generalizes the model to a case in which
gathering this information is costly. The hub rm has close links with local nanciers, too.
These links can be the result of ongoing or past nancial relationships. It is sometimes the case
that these local nanciers are organized by the hub rm or by its past employees as reported
by Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤ (2004).
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Potential lenders have to be convinced that the projects they plan to nance are promising.
Because the hub rm is known to be a successful rm that has been able to manage very
successful business projects in the area local nanciers can trust its expertise in evaluating
start-ups. Therefore, local nanciers can make use of the local information that a bank cannot
gather. Assume for the moment that the hub rm communicates its ideas honestly, which
allows me to focus on the value of network relationships in isolation. How to guarantee the
credibility of the local information is discussed in section 5.2.
Suppose the hub rm sends a signal  to the local nanciers that takes on one of the two
values: good or bad. That is, it conveys its beliefs about every entrepreneur in its network
by labeling each as good (meaning an entrepreneur with a high success probability project) or
bad (meaning an entrepreneur with a low success probability project). It can, of course, make
wrong judgments. The probability of a good signal for an entrepreneur with a high success
probability project is
Prf = good j i = H ^ i 2 Ng = x x 2 [0; 1] ; (19)
and that for an entrepreneur with a low success probability project is
Prf = good j i = L ^ i 2 Ng = y y 2 [0; 1] : (20)
Then, conditional on a good signal from the hub rm, the Bayesian probability that a loan
applicant is an entrepreneur with a high success probability project is
Prfi = H j  = good ^ i 2 Ng = Prfi = H ^  = good ^ i 2 Ng
Prf = good ^ i 2 Ng =
x
x+ (1  )y ; (21)
and conditional on a bad signal from the hub rm, the Bayesian probability that a loan applicant
is an entrepreneur with a high success probability project is
Prfi = H j  = bad ^ i 2 Ng = (1  x)
(1  x) + (1  )(1  y) : (22)
Similar expressions for the Bayesian probabilities that a loan applicant is an entrepreneur with
a low success probability project are given by
Prfi = L j  = good ^ i 2 Ng = (1  )y
x+ (1  )y (23a)
Prfi = L j  = bad ^ i 2 Ng = (1  )(1  y)
(1  x) + (1  )(1  y) : (23b)
Thus, the belief of the hub rm about the projects of the network entrepreneurs can be im-
perfect. That is, it can label a good project as a bad project with probability 1  x and a bad
project as a good project with probability y. However, a rm that has engaged in many innov-
ative activities and formulated successful business strategies, such as Brush Electric Company,
would on average make valuable judgments about business projects. Given that it has had a
continuous relationship with network entrepreneurs in phase I, it is reasonable to assume that
the hub rms judgments about the network entrepreneurs are useful on average. Technically,
this is achieved if the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds for the distribution
of types. This requires the ratio of the Bayesian probability of a good signal to a bad signal
to be increasing with the type of the project. That is, the ratio (21)=(22) is greater than the
ratio (23a)=(23b) should hold, which boils down to the following assumption.
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Assumption 3 (Informativeness of Signals) Signals are informative: x > y.
Suppose that these signals are received by at least two local nanciers and that they trust
these signals. I assume that signals are private information between the hub rm and the
local nanciers and cannot be credibly communicated to anyone else. However, local nanciers
do know that the hub rm has contacts with other local nanciers, too. Therefore, the local
nanciers have access to some local information that the other lenders do not have.
In the case in which there is no hub-signaling, the average success probability of the loan
applicant pool is given by p and, as is shown in (18a), the equilibrium lending interest rate
is R=p for any loan granted. However, the extra information that the local nanciers have
give them the ability to price discriminate between network entrepreneurs and stand-alone
entrepreneurs. The average success probability of network entrepreneurs with a good signal,
p^, is
p^ =
xpH + (1  )ypL
x+ (1  )y : (24)
Suppose they grant a loan only if they get a good signal from the hub rm. A similar analysis
of section 4.5 with new (Bayesian) incentive constraints and (Bayesian) zero prot conditions
shows that local nanciers o¤er a lending interest rate of R=p^ to any network entrepreneur with
a good signal. A simple comparison of (17) and (24) depicts that p^ > p as long as x > y, which
holds by Assumption 3. Therefore, the existence of a network allows local nanciers to provide
cheaper loans to network entrepreneurs with a good signal.
Those labeled with a bad signal are denied the privileged loans provided by the local nanciers.
From the perspective of the local nanciers, the average success probability of the loan appli-
cants that are standing alone, p, is given by
p =
pH + (1  )pL
 + (1  ) : (25)
It is easy to show that p < p. However, note that those who could not get a privileged loan from
the local nanciers can apply for loans as stand-alone entrepreneurs. This changes the average
success probability of the stand-alone loan applicants. Having known this, banks and local
nanciers would set the price of the loans accordingly. The new average success probability
outside the network is now given by
~p =
[(1  x) + (1  )]pH + [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL
[(1  x) + (1  )] + [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] : (26)
It is also easy to show that ~p < p. The reason for this is the following. The average success
probability of the whole population is p. A sample of this population, which has an average
success probability of p^ > p, is in the network. Therefore, the average success probability of
the remaining population has to be less than p.
Suppose this static game is played at every period. Then, the network of the hub rm which
is known to be a successful rm incubates start-ups with better chances of survival on average
than the rest of the start-ups. This means a better match of capital to ideas in the network.
That is, networks of successful established rms give birth to further successful rms. I record
this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Success breeds success in the network.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium contracts with and without hub-signalling
Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of hub-signaling in the credit market. In the absence of hub-signaling
all lenders o¤er one pooling contract for all borrowers. In this case, the zero prot condition
is given by ZPp and the equilibrium contract is characterized by C, which is the same C
shown in Figure 3. When there is hub-signaling, the local nanciers can e¤ectively price
discriminate between the two groups of borrowers. The rst group is composed of network
entrepreneurs that are labeled with a good signal by the hub rm. Given the information
structure, local nanciers have an informational advantage on the quality of these rms. The
zero prot condition is given by ZPp^ for the loans they provide to the entrepreneurs labeled
with good signals. The equilibrium contract for this group is given by C. This contract
gives higher payo¤s to the entrepreneurs in case of a good state at the end of the period. The
second group is composed of two di¤erent kinds of entrepreneurs: stand-alone entrepreneurs
and network entrepreneurs who are labeled with a bad signal by the hub rm and thus were
denied the privileged loans. The average success probability in this group is ~p and the zero prot
condition of the banks is given by ZP~p. The corresponding equilibrium contract is C. This
contract provides a smaller payo¤ to the entrepreneurs in the good state. Table 1 summarizes
the lending interest rates o¤ered by lenders.
Lending Interest Rate
for stand-alone for network
entrepreneurs entrepreneurs
without Banks R=p R=p
hub-signaling Local Financiers R=p R=p
with Banks R=~p R=~p
hub-signaling Local Financiers R=~p R=p^
Note: ~p < p < p^.
Table 1: Lending interest rates
The results would still go through even if the entrepreneurs are risk averse. In section 5,
I show that the existence of a network makes either both high and low success probability
entrepreneurs better o¤ or only the high success probability entrepreneurs better o¤. Being a
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part of the network is preferable by both parties in the former case. In the latter case, low
success probability entrepreneurs would not want to be known as network entrepreneurs, but
any explicit action they can take (including leaving the network) would perfectly signal their
types. Therefore, they prefer staying in the network after learning their types.13 Nonetheless,
they might want to provide side payments to the hub rm to collapse the informative signaling
mechanism. As is shown in section 5, even when such side payments are allowed the network
still persists. Noting that all entrepreneurs have the freedom to leave the network any time
they want, this suggests that the qualitative results are robust even with risk-averse agents.
4.7 Functional and dysfunctional networks
The results imply that the start-ups that are nanced by the privileged loans of the local
nanciers are going to be more successful on average. However, this does not mean that the
region benets from it. As the model shows, entrepreneurs denied the privileged loans can
apply for loans as stand-alone entrepreneurs. In the end, although some of the entrepreneurs
will be paying lower prices for the loans, all rms will have access to credit, and thus, the
distribution of types will be the same as in the case in which there is no hub-signaling. The
only benet of the network to the society is thus the fact that it is an incubator of relatively
more high success probability rms (that is  > ) by serving as a place for social interactions,
which happens in phase I. In phase II, the network creates an island of entrepreneurs who have
high success probability start-ups on average which allows them to get cheaper loans.
In general the performance of the network is dependent on the informativeness of the signals.
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) show that a nonmarket institution (a network of entrepreneurs in
this paper) may be dysfunctional in cases in which it is informationally disadvantaged relative
to the market institution. In this paper, I assume that the signals are informative, but, from a
social point of view, the outcome of the economy is not any better than the equilibrium without
the hub-signaling mechanism. Therefore, nonmarket institutions may not only be dysfunctional
when they are informationally disadvantaged as suggested in Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) but
may also be useless for the goals of society even when they have superior information about
the economy. The benets of the nonmarket institution accrue only to its privileged members
in terms of prices of the loans, but those who are able to enter into entrepreneurship are still
the same.
I should underline that the argument I provide here is not trying to show that networks are
completely useless. They indeed serve the goals of society in Phase I by creating a dispropor-
tionately high number of high success probability projects. However, I do want to attack the
partial view that the observation of a group of successful entrepreneurs in a network is su¢ cient
to conclude that this network is socially desirable. As the simple model shows here, it may
well be the case that the network has created an island of successful entrepreneurs by selecting
them from the population, but it has not increased the number of high success probability
projects at all.
4.8 Monopolistic local nancier
An important thing to note is that the price of the loan o¤ered to the network entrepreneurs
does not necessarily decrease due to hub-signaling. This result is dependent on the structure
13Remember that entrepreneurs make their decisions on whether to join ot not to join the network before
they learn their types, which happens in Phase I.
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of the loan market. In the previous sections, I assume that the lenders are in a Bertrand
competition. In general, lenders (in particular local nanciers) may have monopolistic power
that prevents prices from going down. To see that, suppose for the moment an extreme case
in which there is only one local nancier that has access to the signals of the hub rm. The
extra information it has e¤ectively improves its expected non-repayed loans such that if it were
to compete with others, its zero-prot condition would be characterized by ZPp^ in Figure 4.
However, the monopolistic local nancier does not need to pass on this cost decrease to the
loan applicants. Since other lenders are o¤ering R=p it cannot achieve the complete monopoly
prots either. If it asks for higher interest rates than R=p, the network entrepreneurs can
simply apply for loans as stand-alone rms. Therefore, the monopolistic local nancier o¤ers
the same loan price that all others are currently o¤ering in the market and enjoys prots of
R(1=p   1=p^) per dollar lent. In general, the outcome depends on how informed the lenders
are.
Petersen and Rajan (1994) assume that the decreases in cost of loanable funds are passed on
to the borrowers. In the model here, the cost of loanable funds which is nothing but the
risk-free interest rate R does not change. However, the monopolistic local nancier expects
to have a lower number of defaults. This e¤ectively decreases its expected losses, but it does
not need to reect this situation to the borrowers because of its monopoly power.
Note that this has nothing to do with the fact that success breeds success in the network. Even
though the price of the loans does not go down in the case of a monopolistic local nancier,
there is still a better match of capital to ideas among those who are nanced by the privileged
loans of the local nancier. That is, the average success probability in the network is higher
than that outside the network.14
5 Incentives for hub-signaling
Until now, I have assumed that there are certain incentives for the hub rm to form the signaling
mechanism. Here, I analyze the incentives for such an organization. Credit markets undervalue
the start-ups of entrepreneurs with high success probability projects while they overvalue the
start-ups of entrepreneurs with low success probability projects. From an ex ante point of
view, in the absence of hub-signaling, the market value of any start-up rm, V, is given by
V = pY  RI ; (27)
regardless of whether the entrepreneur has a high or a low success probability project. The
hub-signaling mechanism changes the levels of under- and overvaluation of start-ups. When
there is hub-signaling, the market value of the start-up of a network entrepreneur with a high
success probability project, VH , is
VH = [xp^+ (1  x)~p]Y  RI ; (28)
and that of a network entrepreneur with a low success probability project, VL, is
VL = [yp^+ (1  y)~p]Y  RI : (29)
14Outside of the network includes stand-alone entrepreneurs and network entrepreneurs who are labeled with
a bad signal. The second group is considered to be outside the network since they independently apply for
loans.
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The following proposition proves that network entrepreneurs with high success probability
projects always prefer hub-signaling, but the preference of network entrepreneurs with low
success probability projects depends on the network size, the number of high success probability
projects in the network, and the informativeness of the signals.
Proposition 4 A network entrepreneur with a high success probability project always prefers
hub-signaling. A network entrepreneur with a low success probability project prefers hub-
signaling when the network is large enough (i.e.; given the signal structure  > y
x+(1 )y )
or alternatively when signals are not su¢ ciently informative (i.e.; given the network size
x
y
> 1 (1 )

). Otherwise, they prefer the status-quo.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This suggests that, given the size of the network, hub-signaling benets the network entrepre-
neurs with low success probability projects only if the signals are not so informative or, given
the signal structure, it benets them only if the network is large enough. The reason for this
result is the cross-subsidization induced by the contractual structure of the credit market. The
start-ups of the network entrepreneurs with low success probability projects are overvalued due
to pooling contracts, and this results in a wealth distribution from the owners of undervalued
start-ups to the owners of overvalued start-ups. Therefore, the pricing of the projects is not the
rst-best. Hub-signaling can improve the situation by mitigating the adverse selection problem
for some network entrepreneurs.
Ex ante, the owners of high success probability projects face the chance of getting a good
signal with probability x while they also face the possibility of a bad signal, in which case
their project is going to be even further undervalued. However, it turns out that, as long as
signals are informative, the former dominates the latter in expected payo¤. The situation is
di¤erent for the network entrepreneurs with low success probability projects. They always
want to misrepresent themselves as having high success probability projects. Given a network
of a xed size, they still have a chance to be labeled with a good signal if the signals are not
very informative. This increases the level of overvaluation to even higher levels. However, if
the signals are su¢ ciently informative, they are more likely to be labeled as bad by the hub-
signaling mechanism, in which case they have to get loans with an interest rate of R=~p. From
another perspective, given the signal structure of the hub rm, if the network is large enough,
they still have a high chance of not being labeled correctly by the signaling mechanism which
might make them better o¤ in expected terms. Therefore, the network entrepreneurs with low
success probability projects are most likely to be worse o¤ in smaller networks with an e¤ective
signaling structure and better o¤ in larger networks with a cumbersome signaling structure.
Corollary 1 When the network is su¢ ciently large (e.g.;  > y
x+(1 )y ), both high and low
success probability project owners prefer hub-signaling.
Proof. The result follows directly from Proposition 4.
Focus now on the more interesting case in which the network is su¢ ciently small (e.g.;  <
y
x+(1 )y ). A network entrepreneur with a high success probability project will be willing to
make a side payment to the hub rm to induce it to organize the hub-signaling mechanism.
This side payment can at most be VH   V. On the other hand, a network entrepreneur with
a low success probability project will be willing to make a side payment to the hub rm to
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prevent it from organizing the hub-signaling mechanism. This side payment can at most be
V   VL.
Whether the hub rm organizes the hub-signaling mechanism depends on the total side pay-
ments from both groups of entrepreneurs. Campbell and Kracaw (1980) claim that there
would not be incentives to engage in information extraction in a simple market with informa-
tion asymmetries, which they call the "nonexistence of rational expectations equilibrium." The
basic intuition for the nonexistence of rational expectations equilibrium is that, since banks
make zero prots, the overvaluation of the rms should exactly match with the undervaluation
of rms in equilibrium. However, the existence of networks overturns this claim. In our setting
the equalities of overvaluation to undervaluation correspond to the following equalities.
[(1  x) + (1  )](pH   ~p) = [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )](~p  pL) (30a)
x(pH   p^) = y(1  )(p^  pL) : (30b)
The rst one focuses on the cross-subsidization between entrepreneurs with high and low suc-
cess probability projects that are either stand-alone entrepreneurs or network entrepreneurs
who are denied privileged loans. The second focuses on the cross-subsidization among the
network entrepreneurs who nance their start-ups with privileged loans. However, these are
ex post realizations. From an ex ante point of view, the total amounts of overvaluation and
undervaluation among network entrepreneurs are not equal to each other, which suggests that
they may be a rational expectations equilibrium. The following proposition formally expresses
this claim.
Proposition 5 When the network is small (e.g.;  < y
x+(1 )y ), the total increase in the
market value of the start-ups of network entrepreneurs with high success probability projects
because of hub-signaling is higher than the total decrease in the market value of the start-ups
of the network entrepreneurs with low success probability projects.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
I am now in a position to state a very important result. In Proposition 4, I showed that when
the network is su¢ ciently small, any network entrepreneur with a high success probability
project is willing to o¤er a side payment to the hub rm to induce it to form the hub-signaling
mechanism and any network entrepreneur with a low success probability project is willing to
o¤er a side payment to the hub rm to prevent it from this mechanism. Moreover, in Corollary
1, I show that both parties prefer hub-signaling if the network is su¢ ciently large. Therefore,
there may be incentives to form the hub-signaling mechanism, which is stated in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2 There are market incentives for the hub rm to arrange the hub-signaling mech-
anism.
Proof. The result directly follows from Proposition 4, Corollary 1, and Proposition 5.
5.1 Costly signaling and the price of a signal
In the previous sections, I assume that the information required for signals is a natural by-
product of close and repeated interaction between the hub rm and the network entrepreneurs.
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This is somewhat realistic; social relationships do occasionally yield useful information. How-
ever, in general, extracting this information can be costly to the hub rm. This section, which
is based on Campbell and Kracaw (1980), sketches the more general case in which the cost of
information extraction is C per network entrepreneur.
Let the side payment that a network entrepreneur with an undervalued project is willing to o¤er
to the hub rm to induce hub-signaling be SH . This side payment can at most be equal to the
total amount of market value change to the start-up of the network entrepreneur (SH < VH  V).
Moreover, it has to cover at least the cost of information extraction (SH > C). Therefore, if
all network entrepreneurs with undervalued start-ups in the network o¤er side payments to the
hub rm, C < SH < (VH   V) has to hold, or simply
C < SH < VH   V : (31)
In the same way, let the side payment that a network entrepreneur with an overvalued project
is willing to pay be SL. This side payment can at most be V   VL, and since not producing the
signal is costless it should also be greater than zero. Therefore, if all network entrepreneurs with
overvalued start-ups in the network o¤er side payments, 0 < (1   )SL < (1   )(V   VL)
has to hold, or simply
0 < SL < V   VL : (32)
In the previous section, I show that the total amount of side payments by the network en-
trepreneurs with undervalued projects is greater than that by the network entrepreneurs with
overvalued projects. Therefore, if
(VH   V)  C > (1  )(V   VL) ; (33)
or simply,
C < VH + (1  )VL   V ; (34)
there can be incentives to form the hub-signaling mechanism. This means that if the cost of
acquiring information is small enough, which is most likely to be the case for an experienced
hub rm such as Brush Electric Company, there will be hub-signaling.
Proposition 6 There exists a level of side payments such that the hub rm invests in signal
extraction.
The importance of this result is that it shows the possibility that asymmetric information results
in ine¢ cient agglomerations. In the previous sections, I show that the match of capital to ideas
remains unchanged as a result of a costless hub-signaling mechanism. However, Proposition 6
shows that hub rms may have incentives to engage in information extraction even when it is
costly to do so.
5.2 Reliability of signals
Some of the men who invested their savings in the new rms were also o¢ cers and
directors of banks. For example, James J. Tracy, one of the original incorporators of
Brush Electric, became vice president of the Society for Savings after a long career in
various other Cleveland nancial institutions. Similarly, Myron T. Herrick, a member of
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the Sperry Syndicate and one of the initial investors in National Carbon, was secretary-
treasurer and then president of the Society for Savings, a founder of the Euclid Avenue
National Bank, a director of the American Exchange National Bank, and a director of the
Gareld Savings Bank. Some of the inventors and other businessmen involved in these
startups and spino¤s also helped to organize nancial institutions during this period [...].
(Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤, 2004, pg. 29)
The implicit assumption in the above analysis is that the hub rm honestly conveys the infor-
mation it has to the local nanciers. In reality, the credibility of the signals is questionable.
One way for local nanciers to overcome this problem is to nance the entrepreneurs in which
the hub rm is also a claimant. That is, if the hub rm claims that the entrepreneurs it la-
bels as good have higher average success probabilities, then it should also be willing to invest
in them. From the other way around, the signals should be credible if the hub rm holds a
su¢ cient amount of equity in the portfolio of start-ups it labels with good signals.
Suppose the hub rm has (x+(1  )y)W units of capital that it can allocate for investment
in the start-ups of the network entrepreneurs. I assume that this wealth is observable by local
nanciers andW < I. I also assume that the local nanciers can verify whether the hub rm in
fact invested in the start-ups of the network entrepreneurs. There are (x+(1  )y) network
entrepreneurs that the hub rm labels with a good signal. An optimal investment strategy for
the hub rm is to invest an equal share of its wealth endowment into these start-ups, which
means that it invests W units of capital in each start-up in its portfolio to get  < 1 share of
each of them.15 If it honestly produces the signals, its payo¤ is
(x+ (1  )y)[p^(Y  R(I  W )) RW ]  C : (35)
The rst term is the net return on investment. It gets  share of each start-up by paying W
for each. There are (x + (1  )y) such entrepreneurs and their average success probability
is p^. Those entrepreneurs need only I  W units of capital from local nanciers to start their
rms. The second term is the cost to the hub rm of extracting information.
Alternatively, the hub rm can choose [x + (1   )y] rms randomly without incurring the
cost of extracting information and announce them as the ones with good signals to the local
nanciers. If it does that, the average success probability in this random sample is going to be
p = pH + (1  )pL ; (36)
where p < p^. This time, the payo¤ to the hub rm is
(x+ (1  )y)[p(Y  R(I  W )) RW ] : (37)
A simple comparison of (35) and (37) shows that, given W , honestly reporting signals is
preferable by the hub rm if it buys a su¢ ciently large share of each start-up:
 >
C
(x+ (1  )y)(Y  R(I  W ))(p^  p) : (38)
This suggests not only that the signals of the hub rm are reliable if it invests in the portfolio
of the start-ups for which it sends signals to the local nanciers but also that a hub rm has
15Note that debt is the optimal way of nancing in this model. However, here, there is a hub rm which
decides rst to buy an  share of the potential start-up, and then, the owner of this potential start-up looks
for nancing for the remaining part of the start-up. So, equity nancing here can be seen as a device used by
the hub rm to credibly send the signals to the local nanciers.
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to have deep pockets to engage in credible hub-signaling. Some of the results of this section
are recorded in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The signals of the hub rm is reliable if it buys a su¢ ciently large share of the
portfolio of start-ups for which it sends good signals to local nanciers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I o¤er some thoughts on how success breeds success locally. I model the pre-
establishment period of start-ups. It is shown that a networking structure leads potential
entrepreneurs and hub rms to form what I call a rationed agglomeration in which there are
both entrepreneurs who interact with each other within the network and other entrepreneurs
in the same business outside the network. I also show that established rms can help network
entrepreneurs in obtaining nancing for their start-ups. Although this help may improve the
match of capital to ideas in the network, the overall distribution of capital to ideas remains
unchanged. Therefore, the only benet of networks to the society at large comes in phase I
of the pre-establishment period the period in which entrepreneurs develop innovative ideas
and work on business plans. The subsequently formed networks can act as places for cross-
fertilization of ideas by generating a disproportionately high number of superior ideas.
It is clear that entrepreneurs have an incentive to join the network of a hub rm, but some of
them cannot do so because of the rationing by the hub rm. However, explaining why a hub
rm forms such a network is not entirely trivial. In the presence of asymmetric information
between the entrepreneurs and nanciers, the market overvalues the start-ups with low success
probabilities and undervalues the start-ups with high success probabilities. When the hub rm
shares its information about the entrepreneurs in its network with the local nanciers, the level
of under- and overvaluation is altered for the network entrepreneurs. This sometimes makes
both parties better o¤, and sometimes makes only the start-ups with high success probabilities
better o¤. In the former case, when both parties are able to provide side payments to the hub
rm, it is obvious that there are incentives for the hub rm to communicate its views to the
local nanciers.
It turns out that the hub rm also has incentives in the latter case, in which only the start-ups
with high success probabilities are beneted so that the interests of the two groups of entre-
preneurs conict. This is simply because the side payments that the start-ups with the high
success probabilities are willing and able to o¤er to the hub rm to induce it to communicate
its ideas to the local nanciers are greater in amount than the side payments that the start-ups
with low success probabilities are willing and able to pay to the hub rm to induce it not to do
so. This suggests that there are certain incentives for the hub rm to decrease the information
gap between the entrepreneurs and the local nanciers. One potential problem in this is that
the hub rm might not share its views honestly with the local nanciers if collecting this in-
formation is costly. Nonetheless, the reliability of the signals is guaranteed whenever the hub
rm buys a su¢ ciently large share of the portfolios of start-ups in its network that it claims are
promising, which is consistent with what is observed in the early stages of industrial districts.
I explain how the information generated in the networks of entrepreneurs around established
rms can mitigate the adverse selection problems for some privileged members of the network
by decreasing the information gap between the network entrepreneurs and local nanciers.
This is one explanation of successful agglomerations such as those found in Cleveland, Ohio
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in the ninetieth century. It remains unexplained, however, why some agglomerations rise up
repeatedly while others rise and then decline.
While writing this paper, I came across the Green Paper: Entrepreneurship in Europe (Euro-
pean Commission, 2003) which stresses that networks between established rms and start-ups
have been becoming increasingly important. Having understood the vitality of such networks
in 1997 the Federal Ministry of Education and Research in Germany launched a program called
EXIST to increase regional cooperation between the economic and scientic actors by forming
networks between them. Two of the aims of the program are to increase knowledge spillovers
and to foster the pool of potential entrepreneurs by creating networks that would otherwise
not be formed. This suggests the feasibility of the idea that the government might improve the
structures of the networks. The normative conclusions and public policies are left for future
research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Assume instead that there is a separating equilibrium. The Bertrand competition among the lenders
requires that they make zero prots in an equilibrium. Therefore, if there were separating contracts,
lenders have to make zero prots from each of these contracts. The zero-prot condition for the
contract designed for entrepreneurs with a high success probability projects is given by
pH(Y   GH)  (1  pH)BH = RI ; (A-1)
and that for an entrepreneur with a low success probability project is given by
pL(Y   GL )  (1  pL)BL = RI : (A-2)
The corresponding iso-prot lines are given by
pH
G
H + (1  pH)BH = YH (A-3a)
pL
G
L + (1  pL)BL = YL ; (A-3b)
where YH and YL are the levels of YH and YL. If there were a separating contract, eqs. (A-1)-(A-3b)
would have to be satised simultaneously. However, note that (A-1) is parallel to (A-3a) and (A-2) is
parallel to (A-3b) in the B   G space, and the slope of the former group is smaller than that of the
latter group. Given limited liability, these four equations cannot be satised at the same time with a
separating contract. A contradiction is obtained. Therefore, there are no separating contracts.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
If the di¤erence between VH and V is positive, the market value of the start-up of a network entre-
preneur with a high success probability project increases due to hub-signaling. That is, VH   V =
[xp^+ (1  x)~p]Y   pY > 0. This holds when
xp^+ (1  x)~p > p : (A-4)
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By substituting for ~p, p, and p^, one can get
(pH   pL)(x  x  (1  )y)[x  (x+ y(1  ))( + (1  ))]
[x+ (1  )y][1  (x+ y(1  ))] > 0 :
It can be easily veried that the terms (pH   pL) and [x+ (1  )y] are positive. Then, (A-4) holds
when
(x  [x+ (1  )y])[x  (x+ y(1  ))( + (1  ))]
1  (x+ y(1  )) > 0 :
The rst term in the numerator is positive because x + (1   )y is a weighted average of x and y,
and therefore, it is between x and y. Multiplying this with , one get a number between x and y,
which is denitely less than x. Moreover, by similar reasoning, the term in the denominator is also
positive since (x+ y(1  )) is less than one.
Below is the second term in the numerator.
[x  (x+ y(1  ))| {z }
<x
( + (1  ))| {z }
<
> 0 : (A-5)
It is obvious that  + (1  ) is between  and , and thus, it is less than . Above I have already
shown that x+ y(1  ) < x. Then, the second term in (A-5) has to be less than x, which implies
that the term is positive. Therefore, hub-signaling benets the network entrepreneurs with a high
success probability projects.
Similarly, if the di¤erence between V and VL is positive, the market value of the start-up of a network
entrepreneur with a low success probability decreases due to hub-signaling. That is, V   VL =
pY   [yp^+ (1  y)~p]Y > 0. This holds when
yp^+ (1  y)~p < p : (A-6)
By substituting for ~p, p, and p^, one can get
(pH   pL)[y   x  (1  )y)][x  (x+ y(1  ))( + (1  ))]
[x+ (1  )y][1  (x+ y(1  ))] < 0 :
Above I have already shown that x  (x+y(1 ))(+(1 )) > 0 and 1  (x+y(1 )) > 0.
It is left to nd out when y   x  (1  )y) < 0 holds:
y   x  (1  )y) < 0
x
y
>
1  (1  )

 <
y
x+ (1  )y :
This means that hub-signaling benets the network entrepreneurs with a low success probability
projects only if  > yx+(1 )y (given the signal structure) or
x
y <
1 (1 )
 (given the network size).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
For any start-up of a network entrepreneur with a high success probability project, VH  V = [xp^+(1 
x)~p]Y   pY > 0, and there are  of them. In the same way, for any start-up of a network entrepreneur
with a low success probability project, V VL = pY   [yp^+(1 y)~p]Y > 0, and there are 1  of them.
Hence, the increase in the market value of the start-ups of entrepreneurs with high success probability
projects due to hub-signaling is higher than the total decrease in the market value of the start-ups of
entrepreneurs with low success probability projects if [xp^+ (1  x)~p  p] > (1  )[p  yp^  (1  y)~p]
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or alternatively if the following inequality holds.
[x+ (1  )y]p^+ [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)]~p > p : (A-7)
By substituting for ~p, p, and p^ into (A-7), one can get
xpH + (1  )ypL + [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)]
 [(1  x) + (1  )]pH + [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL
[(1  x) + (1  y)(1  )] + (1  ) > p :
After some manipulation
xpH + (1  )ypL + [(1  x) + (1  )]pH + [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL
 + (1 )[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)]
> p
or equivalently
(1 )[xpH+(1 )ypL]
[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)] + [ + (1  )]pH + [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL
 + (1 )[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)]
> p :
However, the second term on the numerator is nothing but p. Therefore,
(1 )[xpH+(1 )ypL]
[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)] + p
 + (1 )[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)]
> p
(1  )[xpH + (1  )ypL] + [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)]p
[(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)] + (1  ) > p
or equivalently
(1  )[xpH + (1  )ypL] + [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)]p
> p[[(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)] + (1  )] :
Arranging gives
(1  )[xpH + (1  )ypL] > p[(1  )  [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)](1  )]
(1  )[xpH + (1  )ypL] > p(1  )[1  (1  x)  (1  )(1  y)]
xpH + (1  )ypL > p[1  (1  x)  (1  )(1  y)]
xpH + (1  )ypL > p[x+ (1  )y]
xpH + (1  )ypL
x+ (1  )y > p
p^ > p :
Therefore, the right-hand side of (A-7) is always greater than the left-hand side.
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